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Barents Sea Fisheries – the IUU 
Struggle
Olav Schram Stokke, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute
Abstract: Considerable fishing operations occur in the European part of the 
Arctic Ocean, especially in waters under Norwegian and Russian jurisdiction, 
and regional states have recently made important advances in combating illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.1 During the 2000s, illegal harvest-
ing of Northeast Arctic cod reached levels that jeopardized stock  sustainability 
and coastal-state quota restraint, shifted wealth from legal fishers to cheat-
ers, and promoted corrupt practices in production and distribution chains. A 
strengthening of various port-state measures appears promising for combating 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the region. Such measures have 
evolved from unilateral refusal to allow landing of fish taken outside interna-
tional quota arrangements to a multilateral Scheme of Control and Enforcement 
under the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC).
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Measures and the Combat of IUU Fishing: Institutional Interplay and Effective Governance 
in the Northeast Atlantic”, Marine Policy (33) 2009, and appears with kind permission from 
Elsevier Science. I would like to thank Steinar Andresen, Alf Håkon Hoel, Kristin Rosendal, 
Jon Birger Skjærseth, Davor Vidas, Oran Young, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful 
comments. The work has been funded by the Research Council of Norway under AREAL grant 
no. 177977, “Agriculture and Fisheries Policies between International Regimes on Trade and 
the Environment”.
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1. Purpose and plan
The Arctic Ocean borders on Greenland, Canada, Alaska, Russia and Norway; 
it includes the Beaufort, Chukchi, Greenland, Barents, and Norwegian seas.2 
Considerable fishing operations occur in the European part of this ocean, par-
ticularly in waters under Norwegian and Russian jurisdiction. Especially impor-
tant are the fisheries for Northeast Arctic cod, currently the world’s biggest cod 
stock. Trawlers from the coastal states and several other European nations take 
some two-thirds of the annual harvest, the remainder being caught by numerous 
relatively small but quite effective Norwegian coastal vessels using passive gears. 
During the 2000s, illegal harvesting of Northeast Arctic cod reached very high 
levels, accounting in some years for 20 to 25 per cent of total catches.3 Such levels of 
quota overfishing jeopardize the ecosystem and the legitimacy of regional manage-
ment measures, as well as shifting wealth from legal fishers to cheaters and promot-
ing corrupt practices in fish production and distribution in Europe and beyond.4
This article examines illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing for 
Northeast Arctic cod and the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures that 
states have taken to address this problem. The next section outlines the regional 
institutions for managing this resource and pinpoints the means available under 
the Law of the Sea for combating IUU fishing. Section 3 outlines various categories 
of IUU fishing for cod in the Northeast Atlantic and their ecological, economic 
and political impacts. Section 4 describes a set of trade-restrictive measures that 
have emerged as a result, Section 5 examines their effectiveness, and the final sec-
tion summarizes the findings.
2. The Barents Sea fisheries regime
The structure and the norms of regional fisheries management institutions relate 
closely to globally applicable rules, and efforts to strengthen the basis for conser-
vation and management occur at both levels. In October 2007, the US Congress 
passed a resolution instructing the administration to “initiate international discus-
sions and take necessary steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement 
or agreements for managing migratory, transboundary, and straddling fish stocks 
2.  “Arctic Ocean”, Philip’s World Encyclopedia, 2008. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford 
University Press. Accessed from Fridtjof Nansen Institute. 18 September 2008: <http://www.
oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t142.e621>.
3.  ICES, ICES Advice 2010, Book 3 The Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea (www.ices.dk). 
Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 2010.
4.  Stokke, Olav Schram, “Trade Measures and the Combat of IUU Fishing: Institutional Interplay 
and Effective Governance in the Northeast Atlantic” in Marine Policy (33) 2009 pp. 339–349.
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in the Arctic Ocean and establishing a new international fisheries management 
organization or organizations for the region”.5 Migratory species move across re-
gions; transboundary stocks move across national jurisdictions; and straddling 
stocks are those occurring both on the high seas and in national zones. The back-
ground for the US initiative was work on the development of a federal manage-
ment plan concerning stocks occurring in the US exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, where no commercial harvesting has occurred 
so far. Spurring the initiative was the retreat of the ice north of the Bering Strait 
during the summer months, which has led to improved fishing opportunities in 
the region. In August 2009, the US Secretary of Commerce approved and adopted 
the Arctic Fisheries Management Plan, placing a precautionary moratorium on 
commercial fisheries in the management area and making future activities con-
ditional on adequate information concerning impacts on target species and eco-
system components.6
The US Congress resolution on a new international fisheries management 
 organization explicitly includes the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea and the Greenland 
Sea within its ambit. Should such a new body materialize, it would have to find its 
place alongside several existing institutions already present in parts of the relevant 
institutional space. In the European segment of the Arctic Ocean, two institu-
tions in particular are central for managing transboundary and straddling fish 
stocks: the Norwegian–Russian Joint Fisheries Commission and the North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). The former, bilateral, commission meets 
 annually to adopt and allocate total quotas and other regulations for several stocks 
shared by Norway and Russia, including Northeast Arctic cod. Its decisions are 
binding on the coastal states unless they opt out within two months. Also non-
coastal states participate in the regime by accepting, in separate bilateral and tri-
lateral agreements, the quotas and technical regulations established by Norway and 
Russia, in return for gaining access to coastal state waters.7 Recently the NEAFC, a 
multilateral organization managing regional high-seas stocks, has acquired a role 
in the system for improving compliance with Northeast Arctic cod regulations.8 
5.  United States, SJ 17 RS, Calendar 407, 110th Congress, 1st Session, available at <www.fakr.noaa.
gov>
6.  NPFMC, Management Plan Concerning Stocks Occurring in the US Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. Anchorage AK: North Pacific Fishery Management 
Council 2009.
7.  Stokke, Olav Schram, “Managing Straddling Stocks: The Interplay of Global and Regional 
Regimes” in Ocean and Coastal Management (43) 2000 pp. 205–234.
8.  Stokke 2009.
olav schram stokke
210
Hence, a regional fisheries management regime is already in place for parts of the 
European Arctic and covers the migratory range of the world’s biggest fish stock.
This regional institution is nested within the global fisheries regime, which 
means that important parameters are set forth in broader international customary 
and treaty law. With respect to fisheries management, flag-state jurisdiction has 
traditionally been central, significantly circumscribed only when harvesters oper-
ate in internal waters or the territorial sea, where the coastal state has sovereignty. 
Various fisheries zones emerged in the post-war period, and since the mid-1970s 
coastal states have been entitled to a 200-mile EEZ involving “sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing” the fish stocks 
and permitting the full range of enforcement activities, including “boarding, in-
spection, arrest and judicial proceedings”.9 Within 200 miles of the baselines of 
Arctic states, therefore, the legal basis for effective fisheries management is strong.
In areas beyond EEZs, in contrast, states are to exercise the freedom of fishing 
with only reasonable regard to the interests of other states; they “have the duty 
to take, or to co-operate with other States in taking, such measures … as may be 
necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas” and “shall, 
as appropriate, co-operate to establish sub regional or regional fisheries organiza-
tions to this end”.10 In recent years, these global rules on high-seas fisheries have 
been sharpened,11 mostly through the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement.12 This 
agreement, which is binding on all Arctic states, strengthens the duty to co-oper-
ate with other states on high-seas fisheries by providing that only states that are 
members of a regional fisheries regime, or that agree to apply the conservation and 
management measures taken under such a regime, shall have access to the fishery. 
With respect to enforcement on the high seas, the Fish Stocks Agreement con-
firms stronger flag-state responsibilities, notably to prevent their own vessels from 
 engaging in high-seas fishing without a permit, and specifies procedures allowing 
non-flag states, under certain conditions, to inspect and detain fishing vessels on 
the high seas. The agreement also encourages port states to conduct inspections of 
9.  Law of the Sea Convention, Arts. 56 (sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone) and 73, 
para. 1 (enforcement). Available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>.
10.  Law of the Sea Convention, Arts. 116 and 119 (reasonable regard), 117 and 119 (conservation), 
and 118 (co-operation).
11.  Stokke, Olav Schram (ed.), Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay of Global and Regional 
Regimes. Oxford University Press 2001.
12.  The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Available at <http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>.
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vessels voluntarily in port, and to prohibit landings and transhipment whenever 
inspections have “established that the catch has been taken in a manner which 
undermines the effectiveness of … conservation and management measures on 
the high seas”.13 Within the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), states 
have recently expanded and specified port-state commitments in an Agreement 
on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing, not yet in force.14
Hence, long-term trends in international fisheries law applicable to the Arctic 
Ocean have involved spatial contraction of the high seas and more specific con-
straints on the freedom of fishing on the high seas. Unfortunately, as the next 
section shows, the recent dynamism in international fisheries law as implemented 
has failed to prevent the emergence of very substantial IUU fishing for the Arctic 
Ocean’s most valuable fish stock, Northeast Arctic cod, with unregulated fishing in 
a high-seas pocket of the Barents Sea, and illegal and unreported fishing in waters 
under national jurisdiction.
3. Anatomy of the IUU problem in the Barents Sea
As the FAO15 acknowledges, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
is a highly diverse phenomenon. Illegal fishing violates relevant “national laws or 
international obligations”. Unreported fishing is that which “has not been reported, 
or has been misreported” to the relevant national authority or international fish-
eries organization, “in contravention of” national or international procedures. 
Unregulated fishing, finally, refers to harvesting by vessels without nationality or 
flying the flag of a non-party in “the area of application of a relevant regional fish-
eries management organization” or outside such areas if “conducted in a manner 
inconsistent with State responsibilities ... under international law”. Meeting any 
one of these three criteria is enough to qualify as an IUU fisher.
This section considers two subsets of IUU fishing in the Barents Sea. One subset 
is simply ‘unregulated’ and concerns harvesting in a high-seas pocket between 
the EEZs of Norway and Russia. A much larger subset combines ‘illegal’ with 
‘unreported’ fishing; it involves mostly Russian harvesting vessels, Norwegian 
13.  Fish Stocks Agreement, Arts. 8 (access to fishery), 21 (at-sea inspection) and 23 (port state 
measures).
14.  Adopted by the FAO Conference 22 November 2009; as of 3 March 2010, this treaty had 13 of 
the 25 ratifications needed for entry into force; see <http://www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/037s-e.
htm>.
15.  FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (www.fao.org). Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization 2001.
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processors, transport vessels flying a variety of flags, and fish importers in nu-
merous EU states.
3.1 Unregulated fishing in the Loophole
Harvesting operations in the ‘Loophole’, a high-seas area located between the 
Norwegian and Russian EEZs, were extensive during the first half of the 1990s but 
not thereafter. Due to changes in water temperature and salinity, the availability 
of cod increased markedly around 1990.16 Northeast Arctic cod thus became a 
straddling as well as a shared stock. Although the presence of ice made for a short 
season, this new fishing opportunity drew the attention of distant-water vessel 
operators. Vessels from Iceland dominated in the Loophole, and soon as many as 
eighty trawlers flying the Icelandic flag had a history of operating in the area. Eager 
to establish a ‘real interest’ in this stock, Iceland carefully recorded and published 
the catches, which were additional to the annual quotas set and allocated under 
the Norwegian–Russian Joint Fisheries Commission.17
The coastal states, Norway and Russia, agreed to step up monitoring in the area 
by greater presence of control vessels, but refrained from stretching international 
law regarding unilateral enforcement measures beyond 200 miles. Despite pressure 
from industry organizations calling for emergency measures and greater activism, 
at no time did the coastal states use patrol vessels for non-courtesy boarding or 
detention of foreign vessels.18 Such measures, were they to contribute to the making 
of international law, would require consent or acquiescence on the part of those 
subject to them, as well as third parties. Even for a stock occurring largely within 
EEZs, other user-states would hardly perceive unilateral coastal-state enforcement 
on the high seas as compatible with customary international law, unless bona fide 
attempts to reach agreement with other users had failed and the stock was un-
equivocally in jeopardy due to the activity in question.19 Compared to other areas 
with extensive high-seas fisheries of stocks occurring mainly within EEZs, as in 
16.  Stokke, Olav Schram, “Managing Fisheries in the Barents Sea Loophole: Interplay with the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement” in Ocean Development and International Law (32) 2001 pp. 241–262.
17.  The Fish Stocks Agreement (Art. 8) provides that regional management regimes shall be open 
to states with a ‘real interest’ but fails to define the concept; see Stokke 2000. Historical catches 
are an important allocative criterion in regional fisheries management organizations.
18.  Stokke 2001.
19.  Burke, William T., “Fishing in the Bering Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks and the New 
International Law of Fisheries” in Ecology Law Quarterly (16) 1989 pp. 285–310 (285).
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the Bering Sea ‘Doughnut Hole’20 or the Head and Tail of the Grand Banks in the 
Northwest Atlantic,21 the Loophole case was an unlikely candidate for attracting 
the political consent necessary for such legal advance. At the peak in 1994, un-
regulated catches of Northeast Arctic cod represented no more than a third of the 
increase in total quotas from the preceding year. Such a level of IUU fishing was 
more a nuisance than a sustainability threat. Moreover, Iceland repeatedly declared 
its willingness to negotiate with the coastal states.22 International negotiations 
continued on and off until the 1999 trilateral Loophole Agreement, which gave 
Iceland a small share of the cod stock in return for accepting coastal-state regula-
tion and refraining from seeking fishing rights for cod in the Fisheries Protection 
Zone around Svalbard.23 The coastal states’ difficulties of justifying unilateral-
ism under international fisheries law induced them to explore other compliance 
measures, notably related to international trade, as will be elaborated in Section 4.
3.2 Illegal and unreported fishing
The first of two waves of quota overfishing in the region coincided with the ex-
tensive Loophole fisheries, while the more recent wave occurred in the 2000s. The 
Advisory Committee under the International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea (ICES) provides annual quota recommendations on Northeast Arctic cod. The 
ICES estimates that unreported catches of this stock in the early 1990s rose to 130 
thousand tonnes in 1992 – more than a third of that year’s total cod quota.24 Most 
of those catches were by Russian vessels, according to the Norwegian Fisheries 
Directorate, which had compiled the data underlying the Advisory Committee 
estimate from Russian logbooks, port-delivery reports and international trade sta-
tistics.25 Understandably, the exposure of huge quota overfishing scandalized the 
regional fisheries regime and triggered an intensive search for effective remedies.
20.  Balton, David A., “The Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention: Regional solution, global im-
plications” in Stokke, O. S. (ed.), Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay of Global and 
Regional Regimes, Oxford University Press 2001 pp. 143–77.
21.  Joyner, Christopher C., “On the Borderline? Canadian activism in the Grand Banks” in Stokke, 
O. S. (ed.), Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes, 
Oxford University Press 2001 pp. 207–33.
22.  Stokke 2001.
23.  Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government of Norway and the 
Government of the Russian Federation concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the 
Area of Fisheries. St. Petersburg,15 May 1999; entry into force the same day. Overenskomster 
med fremmede makter 1999 p. 838.
24.  ICES 2010.
25.  NTBTekst (29 April 1993).
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Illegal and unreported fishing of such magnitude was possible due to the in-
corporation of the north-west Russian fishing industry into the global market 
economy, following the radical reordering of the Soviet society that Gorbachev 
launched in the late 1980s. Perestroika triggered a rapid rise in Russian landings 
in Western ports, which in turn undermined the traditional Soviet monitoring 
system, with juxtaposition of catch reports and delivery reports from processing 
units. Three factors explain this change. One was the dismantlement of the huge 
fisheries complex Sevryba, which loosened the ties between the harvesting fleet and 
the domestic processing industry.26 A second factor was the growing inability of 
Murmansk-based processors at the time to compete with Western processors for 
Russian cod. A third factor emerged later, as turf struggles and legal complexity 
in Russia’s fisheries enforcement system made domestic landings time-consuming 
and costly endeavours that vessels sought to avoid.27 Those three factors funda-
mentally altered the market orientation of Russian fishing vessel operators from 
domestic to West European ports, which in turn undermined the effectiveness of 
Russian rule-enforcement activities.
Russian landings abroad meant that domestic fisheries-enforcement agencies 
were no longer able to cross-check fisher reports with port-delivery data, and 
that greatly increased the leeway for contravening quota and reporting require-
ments. The establishment in 1993 of a Permanent Committee for Regulation and 
Control under the Joint Fisheries Commission facilitated regular sharing of data 
on Russian catches in Norwegian ports and Russian vessel activities in waters 
under Norwegian jurisdiction. Soon the Permanent Committee became an arena 
for elaborating a wide range of joint measures for improving the implementation 
of regional regime rules. Notable examples are regular exchanges of information 
about national fisheries legislation, annual seminars involving enforcement per-
sonnel of the two states, exchanges of observers on each other’s control vessels, 
common conversion factors between whole fish and the processed products that 
enforcement personnel usually find onboard, and the coordination of satellite 
tracking systems.28
26.  Stokke, Olav Schram, Lee G. Anderson and Natalia Mirovitskaya, “The Barents Sea Fisheries” 
in Young, O. R. (ed.) The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal 
Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999 pp. 91–154.
27.  Hønneland, Geir, Russian Fisheries Management: The Precautionary Approach in Theory and 
Practice. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2004 pp. 138.
28.  Stokke 2009.
barents sea fisheries – the iuu struggle
215
When, around 2000, Russian vessels shifted the thrust of their direct landings 
from Norwegian to various British, German, Dutch, Spanish and other EU ports,29 
such traditional ocean-law measures again proved inadequate. Adding to the dif-
ficulties of monitoring landings abroad has been the growing involvement of at-sea 
transhipment from Russian trawlers to transport vessels, which facilitates attempts 
to disguise the amount of actual catches. The ICES estimates that total unreported 
catches of Northeast Arctic cod in this second wave of quota overfishing ranged 
from 90 thousand tonnes in 2002 to more than 160 thousand tonnes in 2005.30 An 
important basis for these estimates has been satellite tracking data of fishing and 
transport-vessel movements to main ports, combined with assessments of vessel 
storage capacity that enforcement agencies derive from inspections and vessel 
registers.31 Uncertainties regarding loading extent, species composition, and the 
mix of fillet and head-and-gutted products indicate, however, that these figures 
should be treated with some caution. On the one hand, Russian authorities find 
recent ICES estimates of unreported catches too high, but acknowledge substan-
tial unreported fishing by vessels flying their flag.32 On the other hand, the ICES 
does not offer any specific estimate of unreported catches before the very high 
2002 figure. The conditions enabling large-scale overfishing were present also in 
preceding years – notably, large transhipment-based exports to EU markets and 
high cod availability relative to the quota.33 Therefore, a gradual rather than abrupt 
emergence of Russian quota overfishing beginning around the turn of the century 
would seem to be the most plausible pattern.
Hence, substantial quota overfishing of Northeast Arctic cod on the part of 
Russia during the first parts of the 1990s and the 2000s occurred because the 
 regime’s compliance system had not yet adapted to certain radical changes in the 
distribution strategies of vessels operators.
29.  Hønneland, Geir, Kvotekamp og kyststatssolidaritet: Norsk-russisk fiskeriforvaltning gjennom 
30 år. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget 2006 pp. 80.
30. ICES 2010.
31.  Norway, Directorate of Fisheries, Status Report for 2007: Russian Fishing of Cod and Haddock/
Transhipment at Sea (www.fiskeridir.no). Bergen: Directorate of Fisheries, 2008.
32.  Russia, Office of the Auditor General, Rapport om resultatene av ekspertanalysen ‘Effektiviteten 
av utnyttelsen av kvoter på akvatiske biologiske ressurser tildelt for 2004–2005 til Den russiske 
føderasjon og Kongeriket Norge i samsvar med Den blandede russisk–norske fiskerikommis-
jonens bestemmelser’. Norway, Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av forvaltningen og kontrollen 
av fiskeressursene i Barentshavet og Norskehavet – en parallell revisjon mellom norsk og rus-
sisk riksrevisjon (Doc. 3:2), Oslo: Office of the Auditor General 2007 pp. 203–238.
33.  Stokke 2009.
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3.3 Environmental, economic and political impacts
Figure 1 provides a comprehensive picture of IUU fishing for Northeast Arctic 
cod. The figure summarizes catches that fishers take in conformity with quotas 
allocated under the regional fisheries regime (‘quota catches’ = horizontal stripes), 
ICES estimates of illegal and unreported catches (‘quota overfishing’ = vertical 
stripes), and unregulated fishing of Northeast Arctic cod (‘Loophole catches’ = 
deep grey area).
Figure 1 Quota catches, IUU catches and scientific recommendations, Northeast Arctic 
cod 1989-2009. Note: Catch data from ICES (2010), overfishing estimates are 
contested; scientific recommendations from previous editions of the same 
series; quotas from annual protocols of the Joint Fisheries Commission.
A few comments are in order here. First, even during peak years, unregulated 
catches were relatively modest, dropping to very low levels well before the adoption 
of the Loophole Agreement in 1999. Second, while estimates of illegal and unre-
ported catches of cod are uncertain and contested, they clearly indicate that most 
IUU harvesting of Northeast Arctic cod has occurred by vessels holding licenses to 
fish this species, with peaks in the first halves of the 1990s and 2000s. Contributing 
to the apparent quota loyalty in intermediate years were relatively high quota lev-
els. Third, the broken line indicating ICES catch advice shows that IUU activities 
add to levels of legal, reported and regulated fishing that already exceed scientific 
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recommendations by large margins. The dramatic difference between advised and 
agreed quotas in the early 2000s reflects the ICES implementation of a precaution-
ary approach to fisheries research, implying greater safety margins for stocks that 
drop below certain pre-defined precautionary reference points.34
The consequences of these various kinds of IUU fishing are severe.35 In sustain-
ability terms, they add to the quota-based fishing pressure which, according to the 
best available knowledge, is already too high. Economically, recent amounts of 
quota overfishing imply a substantial redistribution from those fishers who play 
by the rules to those who cheat. Norwegian scientists estimate that without illegal 
fishing, the 2007 quota advice for Northeast Arctic cod would have been 85 per 
cent higher than the actual case.36 Politically, awareness of large-scale IUU activi-
ties undermines the willingness among fishers and managers to keep quotas and 
catches within scientific advice, in part on the assumption that the overfishers are 
those most likely to gain from such restraint. The fact that quota overfishers must 
cover their tracks also implies that these IUU activities underpin corrupt practices 
in the production and distribution chains for Northeast Arctic cod and beyond. 
Moreover, evidence links large-scale overfishing in the region to such other unlaw-
ful activities as illegal trade in drugs or weapons and human trafficking.37 Hence, 
the IUU challenges facing coastal states in the Barents Sea concern not only the 
state of fish stocks but also the distribution of wealth, the role of science-based ad-
vice in precautionary fisheries management, and the more general struggle against 
corruption and crime in the region.
These severe impacts of IUU fishing activities in the Northeast Atlantic, and 
the failure of traditional ocean-law measures to combat them, explain the growing 
interest in various measures that port states may take to reduce the profitability of 
fishing without or in excess of quotas. That is the focus of the next section.
4. The emergence of port-state denial
Frustration with the ineffectiveness of traditional ocean-law measures to combat 
IUU fishing in the Barents Sea induced the coastal states to explore and extend 
measures that could mobilize the competence of port states to examine vessels 
34.  Stokke, Olav Schram and Clare Coffey, “Precaution, ICES and the Common Fisheries Policy: 
A study of regime interplay” in Marine Policy (28) 2004 pp. 117–126.
35.  Stokke 2009.
36.  The actual ICES advice was 309 thousand tonnes; the hypothetical advice without illegal 
catches would be around 570 thousand tonnes, according to Asgeir Aglen of the Norwegian 
Institute of Marine Research; see Fiskeribladet (10 June 2006 p. 9).
37.  Norwegian Minister of Justice, Knut Storberget, quoted in Fiskaren (7 September 2007 p. 6).
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voluntarily in port, and to set conditions for landing and transhipment. The gen-
eral approach is denial: governments and others refuse to grant physical access or 
provision of services to vessels that operate or support IUU fishing. Three measures 
have been in focus in the Northeast Atlantic: documentation schemes, vessel lists, 
and transhipment constraints.
4.1 Reversing the burden of documentation
Port-state requests for documents that can substantiate that fish landed or tran-
shipped originate from legal harvesting operations are one important means for 
combating IUU fishing and have evolved from a unilateral measure to a multilat-
eral scheme. In order to combat unregulated high-seas fishing in the Loophole, 
in 1993 Norway prohibited the landing of fish from stocks subject to Norwegian 
regulation unless taken pursuant to a fisheries agreement between Norway and the 
flag state.38 This ban was later extended to fish caught in contravention of a relevant 
regional fisheries management regime, or by non-members of such a regime. Thus, 
fishing vessels using Norwegian ports as outlets for cargo that include Northeast 
Arctic cod must document their entitlement within the regional regime to engage 
in that fishery. This general approach reduces the cost of compliance activities, by 
placing the burden of proof with the fishers rather than the enforcement agencies. 
Compared to at-sea inspection, examination in port of logbooks, vessel monitoring 
systems, fishing gear, and catch onboard, is safer and far less expensive.
The immediate effect of Norway’s unilateral listing initiative in the early 1990s 
was to force Loophole fishers to obtain bunkering in ports further away from 
the fishing grounds, thus adding to operational costs and cutting their margins. 
However, the effectiveness of a cargo documentation scheme depends crucially 
on the number of participating states. Realizing that broader participation would 
strengthen the clout of this measure, Norway and Russia required in quota agree-
ments with other regional states that they join the ban on landing and tranship-
ment of catches originating from unregulated fishing. As measures to combat 
Loophole fishing of cod, however, those agreements had little effect, since most 
of the vessels were Icelandic and landed their catch in domestic ports.39 The main 
significance of these measures was rather to demonstrate coordination among 
port states when developing new measures in fisheries management and to form 
part of the basis for a multilateral scheme that would later prove its worth against 
illegal fishing within the regional EEZs.
38.  Stokke 2001.
39.  Ibid.
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Various commissions for management of tuna fisheries were frontrunners in 
the development of multilateral documentation schemes.40 In 1999, the NEAFC 
implemented a Scheme of Control and Enforcement involving more stringent re-
porting procedures, satellite-based vessel monitoring, reciprocal inspection rights 
on the high seas, and stricter flag-state commitments to investigate and pros-
ecute infringements.41 This organization also implemented a Scheme to Promote 
Compliance by non-Contracting Party Vessels, under which members are not to 
allow landing or transhipment by a non-member state vessel that has been sighted 
engaging in harvesting in the Regulatory Area without inspection. Such vessels 
are presumed to undermine the effectiveness of the regime unless the operator 
or the flag state can provide documentation showing that the fish was not taken 
in contravention of NEAFC rules. However, while both Iceland and Russia are 
NEAFC parties, none of those schemes had the potential to reduce illegal fishing 
for Northeast Arctic cod, whether in the Loophole or in waters under coastal state 
jurisdiction, since that stock is not among the ‘regulated resources’ under NEAFC. 
The scope of NEAFC, therefore, constrained the relevance of its port-state meas-
ures for the most severe IUU fishing occurring in the European Arctic.
In 2007, however, the NEAFC implemented a more stringent Scheme of Control 
and Enforcement with high potency in the combat of IUU fishing for Northeast 
Arctic cod, especially illegal and unreported catches.42 Under this new scheme, 
members shall not allow a NEAFC vessel to land or tranship frozen fish in its port 
unless the flag state of the vessel that caught the fish confirms that the vessel has 
sufficient quota, has reported the catch and is authorized to fish in the area, and 
that satellite tracking information data correspond with vessel reports.43 This flag-
state confirmation procedure is innovative and involves a recurrent external check 
on the flag state’s implementation of authorization, data recording, and vessel 
monitoring commitments under global and NEAFC rules. Core elements of this 
procedure are emulated in the more recent FAO Agreement on Port State Measures 
which, however, does not oblige the port state to request such confirmation as the 
40.  Palmer, Alice, Beatrice Chaytor and Jacob Werksman, “Interactions Between the World Trade 
Organization and International Environmental Regimes” in Oberthür, S. and Gehring, T. 
(eds.) Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict 
among International and EU Policies, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2006 pp. 181–204.
41.  Stokke 2009.
42.  Stokke 2009.
43.  NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (adopted 2006, with subsequent amendments), 
Chapter V (Port State Control of foreign fishing vessels), especially Arts. 22 (prior notice), 23 
(authorization to land or tranship), and 20 (scope); text of the scheme is available at (www.
neafc.org).
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NEAFC Scheme does.44 A second important feature is that, unlike earlier NEAFC 
schemes, the new system applies not only to regulated resources on the high seas 
but to all “frozen catch of fisheries resources caught in the Convention Area”: 
the latter includes the regional EEZs as well. This broadening of scope makes the 
NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement directly applicable to landings of 
Northeast Arctic cod.
4.2 Blacklisting vessels
While documentation schemes affect landings and transhipment on a cargo-by-
cargo basis, another port-state measure focuses on the vessel and its history. In 
order to constrain Loophole activities, in 1997 Norway implemented a unilateral 
blacklist system concerning fishing vessels with a history of unregulated harvest-
ing for cod in the Barents Sea. Listed vessels will not obtain a license to fish in that 
state’s EEZ, even if they change ownership.45 Norway’s blacklisting also extends 
to port calls and covers both fishing vessels and transport vessels that have taken 
onboard fish in violation of NEAFC rules on transhipment. The basic purpose of 
national and international vessel lists is to magnify the costs that IUU operators 
suffer as a consequence of port-state measures, notably by adding memory and 
in some cases, non-forgiveness. Such lists make it clear that certain vessels have 
a ‘history’, a bad record of involvement in IUU fishing, and they disseminate this 
finding to other states capable of denying fishing vessels access or outlets. Much 
of the IUU fishing in the European Arctic occurs by vessels taking and reporting 
part of their catches in a perfectly legal and regulated manner. If governments 
 allocating fish quotas ban listed vessels from their ship registers, deny them fish-
ing licenses, or prohibit their entry into port, such vessels will become far less 
attractive to IUU operators.46
Due to Norwegian blacklisting, IUU vessel owners had to balance the gains they 
hoped to obtain from unregulated harvesting against the cost of being unable to 
use the vessel legally in Norway’s zone in the future. A longer-term impact was 
to reduce the second-hand value of vessels with a history of contravening con-
servation measures under the coastal states’ Joint Fisheries Commission. Various 
non-coastal states inside and outside the EU obtain around 15 per cent of the total 
quotas of Northeast Arctic cod each year, and waters under Norwegian jurisdic-
44.  FAO Agreement on Port State Measures, Arts. 7 (port designation), 8 (advance request), and 
11 (use of ports).
45.  Stokke 2001.
46.  Stokke, Olav Schram and Davor Vidas, “Regulating IUU Fishing or Combating IUU 
Operations?” in Fish Piracy: Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Paris: 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2004 pp. 19–47.
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tion are the most attractive areas in which to take those quotas. Some evidence 
suggests that such concerns contributed to Iceland’s decision to accept the terms 
of the 1999 Loophole Agreement with the coastal states, although the main rea-
sons were several years of low catches combined with coastal-state preparedness 
to allocate to Iceland a quota for Northeast Arctic cod.47 While Norway has stated 
that listing of a vessel is permanent, the authorities nevertheless removed Icelandic 
vessels from the list following that country’s adoption of the Loophole Agreement, 
which indicates that such removal was a high priority among Icelandic negotiators.
As with cargo documentation requirements, multilateral vessel lists are more 
potent than unilateral ones. The NEAFC created two vessel lists in 2004.48 On its 
Observation List are vessels not flying the flag of a state participating in the NEAFC 
Scheme of Control and Enforcement that have been sighted fishing in the NEAFC 
Convention Area without establishing that the fish were caught in compliance with 
NEAFC rules. Such preliminary listing implies denial of landing, transhipment 
and access to services in member-state ports or by vessels flying a NEAFC-member 
flag. A Permanent Committee for Control and Enforcement meets annually to 
review the Observation List in light of any flag-state explanation or other relevant 
information, and to recommend to the Commission whether a vessel should be 
removed from the list or transferred to the confirmed IUU list. Contracting parties 
to NEAFC are to deny port entry, fishing rights, and the granting of their flag to 
vessels on the confirmed list; their companies and nationals shall not be allowed 
to charter such vessels or import fish from them and are encouraged to avoid their 
produce also at later stages in the distribution chain. Augmenting the force of this 
regional listing scheme, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) 
automatically adds vessels on the NEAFC list to the corresponding list that or-
ganization maintains, and vice versa. Regional fisheries management  institutions 
and the interaction between them significantly enhance the efficacy of vessel lists 
in combating IUU fishing.
4.3 Constraining transhipment
Large amounts of the Northeast Arctic cod originating from Russian vessels reach 
European ports in transport vessels that have obtained their cargo by means of 
 at-sea transhipment. The frequency of such transhipment increased around 2000, 
as smaller Russian trawlers that had previously delivered their catches in Norway 
47.  Stokke, 2001.
48.  NEAFC, Recommendation VIII from the 22nd Annual Meeting (2003); see NEAFC Scheme 
of Control and Enforcement, Arts. 44–45. Until 2007, these provisions applied only to the 
NEAFC Regulatory Area, that is, the regional high seas areas.
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or domestically now turned to Europe. At that time, none of the measures under 
the Joint Fisheries Commission or the NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement 
concerned at-sea transhipment of Northeast Arctic cod, or the subsequent entry 
of the cargo into ports beyond the Barents Sea. That situation created opportuni-
ties for violating quota constraints that numerous vessels exploited, as shown in 
Figure 1.
After several years of mounting evidence of IUU fishing, the Joint Fisheries 
Commission took action on transhipment. It committed Norway and Russia to 
require of their fishing vessels from 2005 that they report any transhipment 24 
hours prior to the event, and to prohibit transhipment to any vessel not registered 
in a state participating in the NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement. From 
2007, the strengthening of that Scheme extends such commitment to all partici-
pating states.49 Like the documentation schemes and the blacklisting of vessels 
with a history of IUU activities, these national, bilateral and regional measures 
to control regional transhipment have considerably narrowed a gap in the web of 
information necessary for fisheries enforcement activities in the European Arctic.
5. Port-state denial and regime effectiveness
A fisheries regime is effective if it serves to change target-group behaviour in ways 
that improve harvesting pressures and, ultimately, the state of stocks. Considerable 
evidence indicates that port-state measures have served to enhance the effective-
ness of the Barents Sea fisheries regime.
A year or so after the first Scheme of Control and Enforcement entered into 
force, the NEAFC Secretariat reported that all elements of the tracking and report-
ing system had been tested and were working well; and by 2002, two thirds of the 
flag-state reports were fully automatic.50 Under the first Non-Contracting Party 
Scheme, the Faroe Islands had banned landings by a Belize-flagged vessel already 
in 2000. The introduction of vessel lists in 2004 containing Dominican vessels 
induced that state to de-register eight vessels that failed to provide adequate infor-
mation, while Belize chose to apply for status as a co-operating state. Subsequent 
listing of a Bahamas-registered vessel induced that state to attend the NEAFC an-
nual meeting as observer, to consider amendments to its fisheries legislation,51 and 
49.  NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement, Arts. 4 (ban on transhipment to outsiders) and 
13 (reporting).
50.  Stokke 2009.
51. NEAFC, Report of the 25th Annual Meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(www.neafc.org). London: North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 2006.
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to apply for status as a co-operating state, as did also Panama the same year.52 In 
2007, six out of twenty vessels on the NEAFC Confirmed List were in the process 
of being scrapped, nine were held back in NEAFC ports, and the remaining five 
were operating outside the Northeast Atlantic.53 As a result of bilateral agreements 
and the mutual endorsement of listings under NEAFC and NAFO, vessels still in 
operation have been denied port access not only in the Northeast Atlantic but also 
by states in North Africa and North America.54 That means that regional port-state 
measures are adding significant costs to IUU harvesting in the European Arctic.
Even more importantly for the combat of IUU fishing for Northeast Arctic 
cod, there has recently been a marked increase in the number of vessel trips by 
Russian vessels from the Barents Sea fishing grounds to Murmansk or Archangel55 
facilitating the tracking by Russian authorities of total catches. While this change 
probably reflects also other developments like the rise in purchasing power in 
north-west Russia, it may also indicate greater transparency of Russian landings 
deliveries in European ports. The latest Norwegian estimate of Russian overfishing 
of Northeast Arctic cod indicates a dramatic decline, from 80 thousand tonnes 
in 2006 to around 15 thousand tonnes in 2008.56 Seen together with the evidence 
above, these developments indicate that port-state measures under NEAFC are 
contributing significantly to problem solving, under not only that organization 
but in the Norwegian–Russian Joint Fisheries Commission as well.
6. Conclusions
The strengthening of global high-seas fishing provisions and close collaboration 
between Russia and Norway on a range of measures deriving from their rights 
and duties as coastal states and flag states failed to prevent very substantial IUU 
fishing for Northeast Arctic cod, especially in the first halves of the 1990s and 
2000s. The impacts on stock sustainability, distribution of gains, corruption, and 
quota responsibility among managers and fishers could be severe. Recent port-state 
52. NEAFC, Report of the 26th Annual Meeting of the North Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(www.neafc.org). London: North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 2007.
53. NEAFC, Report of the Extraordinary Meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission 13–14 June 2007. Volume II – Annexes (www.neafc.org). London: North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission 2007.
54. NEAFC, Developments Since September 2006 in NEAFC’s Attempts to Combat IUU Fishing 
(www.neafc.org). London: North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 2007.
55.  Norway 2008 p. 7.
56.  Norway, Directorate of Fisheries, Status Report for 2008: Russian Fishing of Cod and Haddock 
(www.fiskeridir.no). Bergen: Directorate of Fisheries 2009.
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measures to combat IUU fishing in the Northeast Atlantic complement traditional 
fisheries enforcement activities by exploiting the need that fishing vessels have 
for landing or transhipping their cargo. Compared to monitoring and inspection 
at sea, such measures are cost-effective. The use of port-state trade measures has 
evolved from unilateral denial of the landing of fish taken outside internation-
al quota arrangements involving the coastal states, to a multilateral Scheme of 
Control and Enforcement under the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. 
Certain key components of that scheme – especially the obligation to deny land-
ings or transhipment by foreign vessels unless the flag state confirms that the fish 
was taken in accordance with national and international regulations – appear in 
somewhat diluted form in the 2009 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures, which 
will apply globally when in force. Other important measures under the NEAFC 
Scheme are vessel lists and extensive constraints on at-sea transhipment. The re-
cent extension of this scheme to cover fish taken in the regional EEZs as well has 
greatly enhanced its efficacy in the combat of IUU fishing in the European Arctic.
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Олав Шрам Стокке / Olav Schram Stokke
Серьезная работа, связанная с вопросами рыболовства, была проведена в Ев-
ропейской части Арктического океана, особенно в водах находящихся под 
юрисдикцией Норвегии и России. Государства региона проделали значитель-
ную работу по предотвращению незаконной, неконтролируемой и нерегули-
руемой рыбной ловли (IUU). Во время 2000-х годов нелегальная ловля ат-
лантической трески достигла такого уровня, когда запасы рыбы подверглись 
опасности исчезновения, а ограничения по квоте прибрежных государств 
привели к обогащению мошенников, а не законопослушных рыболовецких 
судов, а также содействовали распространению коррупционных практик в 
цепочке производства и распределения. Усиление разнообразных мер с це-
лью предотвращения незаконного, неконтролируемого и нерегулируемого 
рыболовства, предпринимаемых портовыми государствами, выглядит много-
обещающим. Подобного рода меры включают в себя широкий спектр дейст-
вий от одностороннего отказа принять рыбу, выловленную вне соглашения 
по международной квоте, до многосторонней схемы контроля и принуждения 
под эгидой Комиссии по рыболовству в северо-восточной части Атлантиче-
ского океана (НЕАФК).
